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Abstract 
I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and 
show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s non-
doxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. 
Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that 
avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my 
proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: 
hinges are propositions that are the objects of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally 
revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our 
epistemic practices.   
 
1 Introduction 
As a recent trend in epistemological theorizing, hinge epistemology holds that epistemic justification is 
possible thanks to unjustified and unjustifiable basic assumptions, or hinges, such as that there is an 
external world or that we are not systematically deceived in our epistemic practices. At the same time, 
hinge epistemology tries to distance itself from epistemic relativism. The latter is the view that 
epistemic justification is relative to one’s epistemic system such that, given two radically different and 
competing epistemic systems, there is no neutral, or rational way of determining which one of them is 
epistemically better. In this paper, I deal with this question: how do we have to conceive of hinges in 
order to block epistemic relativism? The version of epistemic relativism relevant in this paper comes 
out of four theses:1 
Dependence: Justification for beliefs is relative to particular epistemic systems. 
Pluralism: There are radically different epistemic systems.  
 
1 This motivation for relativism can be found in Kusch (2013; 2016a) and Carter (2017); see also Baghramian & 
Coliva (2019, ch. 7). Furthermore, there are different definitions of relativism, as well as different arguments that 
motivate it (arguments from underdetermination (Barnes and Bloor 1982) and semantic considerations 
(MacFarlane 2014, Kölbel 2003)). In this paper, I will work with a formulation of relativism from 
incommensurable disagreements as this is a form of relativism that seems most pressing for hinge epistemology. 
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Incommensurability: Given two radically different and competing epistemic systems, there is 
no rational, system-independent, epistemic norm or method to assess and justify one epistemic 
system over the other.  
Equal validity: All epistemic systems are equally valid and are on a par regarding the 
justification of their basic beliefs and methods. 
These theses are considered individually necessary and jointly sufficient to motivate the idea that there 
are different, exclusive, and incompatible epistemic systems that are equally valid and justified.2 
Importantly, this version of epistemic relativism does not entail that all epistemic systems are equally 
reliable, or that there are no instrumental (non-epistemic) reasons to justify our practices of belief 
formation. The relativist rather contends that epistemic norms, understood as the building blocks of an 
epistemic systems and the justifiers of beliefs within it, have relative validity. This, urges the relativist, 
entails that the justification of an epistemic system is itself non-epistemic and that any given epistemic 
system is as justified as its competitors which have their own epistemic norms. A denier of epistemic 
relativism should then show that at least some epistemic norms have non-relative validity and that 
epistemic systems can be epistemically justified.   
Central to this version of relativism is incommensurability: the impossibility of there being an 
epistemic or rational path to resolve what I call a hinge disagreement, in which two parties’ dispute about 
what to believe is rooted in their commitments to different and incompatible grounds to justify their 
respective beliefs. The unavailability of such a path entails that epistemic reasons, that is, considerations 
in favor of what to believe and what to consider as justified, are insufficient to ground our epistemic 
practices. Thus, if a theory of epistemic justification makes room for there being rational resolution of 
hinge disagreements, relativism is unmotivated. If, on the contrary, a theory of justification has the 
consequence that two parties in a hinge disagreement cannot rationally reach a consensus, then such a 
theory is, prima facie, friendly to relativism. As Duncan Pritchard has pointed out (2011, 2018b, 
forthcoming), a theory of epistemic justification entails epistemic relativism when it licenses 
incommensurability. This is particularly relevant when we evaluate whether hinge epistemology leads to 
relativism, since it is seemingly committed to the possibility of there being epistemic systems with 
different, and internally valid, epistemic norms.  
This version of epistemic relativism has been largely discussed in the context of hinge 
epistemology. As I shall show in the next section, hinge epistemology seems to provide a fertile ground 
for these four theses to grow. Most hinge epistemologists, however, are reluctant to embrace relativism, 
 
2 An exception is Williams (2007), who thinks that Dependence, Pluralism and Equal validity are sufficient for 
relativism, provided the relativist argues that justifications for epistemic systems are inevitably circular. 
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even though some epistemologists with relativistic inclinations appeal to hinge epistemology to 
motivate relativism.3 I take it that hinge epistemologists’ success in blocking epistemic relativism 
depends on the appropriate account of hinges, such that it can allow for the possibility of there being 
rational resolution of hinge disagreements. In this paper I am interested in determining the account of 
hinges that allows us to make room for such a possibility.   
Here's the structure of the paper. In Section 2, I show how hinge epistemology seems 
committed to the above four theses of relativism. In Section 3, I examine two influential but different 
accounts of hinges that seek to avoid relativism by denying incommensurability: Coliva’s (2015) 
acceptance and Pritchard’s (2015) non-doxastic accounts. I then present some worries that they face 
when allowing for rational resolution of hinge disagreements. Building upon Pritchard’s and Coliva’s 
accounts, in Section 4 I elaborate on the characteristics that hinges should have in order to make 
possible a rational resolution of hinge disagreements. Roughly, while the attitude of belief cannot be 
directed towards our hinges, there needs to be some doxastic attitude that can, i.e., one that is capable of 
being responsive to rational considerations. Also, hinges should be considered as propositions, that is, 
our hinge-attitudes should be considered as having a content. And thirdly, hinges should be 
discriminative enough to rationally favor, in a non-question begging way, one of the disagreeing parties. 
Before concluding in Section 5, I briefly consider how such an account might look like in order to 
avoid the kind of relativism that emerges from incommensurability.  
2 Epistemic relativism at the door of hinge epistemology4 
Hinge epistemology is best conceived as opposed to traditional epistemological foundationalism, since 
instead of looking for a non-inferential justification of the foundations of knowledge, it starts with the 
idea that rational evaluation and epistemic justification are limited enterprises. The limits and starting 
points of justification posed by hinge epistemology are the so-called hinges. Although there are different 
conceptions of hinges,5 both concerning what they are (propositions, pseudo-propositions, or norms) 
and the appropriate attitude we have towards them (doxastic or non-doxastic), hinge epistemologists 
agree in considering them as conceptually prior to our epistemic practices of justification. These 
propositions are examples of hinges:  
I am not the subject of systematic and sustained deception in my beliefs. 
 
3 See for instance Ashton (2019, forthcoming), Kusch (2013, 2016a, 2017a).   
4 This is a rough exposition of hinge epistemology, but one that suits my purposes of locating the relevant aspects 
of relativism in connection to hinge epistemology. More thorough expositions can be found in Coliva (2010, 
2015, 2016), and Pritchard (2011, 2015, chs. 3-4). 
5 See Coliva (2016). 
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There is an external world. 
What has happened before most likely will happen in the future. 
My cognitive capacities are mostly reliable. 
The Earth has existed for a very long time. 
The following epistemic methods and norms are also examples of hinges, since they determine the role 
that certain kinds of evidence may have in an epistemic system and epistemic practice:  
Observation: If one’s current experience has observational content p then, other things being 
equal (e.g., no presence of defeaters and the assumption that there is an external world), one is 
prima facie rationally justified in believing that p.6 
Induction: If events of type B regularly follow events of type A, and if one has observed that 
events of type B regularly follow events of type A, then one is prima facie rationally justified in 
believing that events of type B follow events of type A.7  
Modus Ponens: If A entails B, and one truly believes that A, then one is rationally justified in 
believing that B.8 
Revelation: One is prima facie rationally justified in believing that p, if p is stated in the Bible (or 
in any other epistemic community’s preferred holy scripture) as the infallible and revealed word 
of God.9 
Those statements, norms, and methods are hinges because they are the conditions of possibility of our 
practices of doubting and justifying beliefs. In this way, hinge epistemology rules out skeptical doubts 
about them by holding that they are not susceptible to rational evaluation.10 This is evident, according 
to hinge epistemology, once the justification for any given belief in a proposition presupposes at least 
one, if not several, of the hinges. For instance, justification for our beliefs about physical objects (their 
location, our perception of them, etc.) is only possible given our background assumption that there are 
physical objects. Relatedly, doubts about those hinges are not intelligible, since there is no independent 
ground that can be added in their favor that could be more certain than them. Consider: what could be 
 
6 Cf. Coliva (2015, 34). 
7 Cf. Coliva (2015, 155). Cf. Also Boghossian (2006, 67). 
8 Cf. Coliva (2015, 177). 
9 Cf. Pritchard (2011, 268), Kusch (2017), also Boghossian (2006, 69). As it shall be clear below, although Coliva 
denies that Revelation is a hinge, there is a natural way of interpreting it as a hinge from within the account that 
she favors. 
10 This is true of Coliva’s (2015) and Pritchard’s (2015) accounts, which I discuss in this paper. Some notable 
exceptions are Wright (2004), Williams (2007), and Kusch (2016b). 
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added in favor of the truth that physical objects exist? It cannot be the fact that there seems to be a 
hand right in front of me, since for there to be true that there is a hand, it has to be true that physical 
objects exist. Or consider a justification of the method of Observation. Any attempt to justify the 
reliability of Observation would make use of the deliverances of the senses; thus, it would be 
epistemically circular, which not only entails no justification at all, but also that the validity of 
Observation cannot be established independently of the use of that very same method. The upshot is 
that hinges, being the starting points and limits of rational and epistemic evaluation, are unjustified and 
unjustifiable (cf. Coliva 2015), or groundless and ungroundable (cf. Pritchard 2015). 
If epistemic justification is only possible relative to hinges, this should mean that hinge 
epistemology is committed to Dependence. I shall assume that hinges, understood as propositions, 
norms and methods, are elements of an epistemic system. Epistemic systems are comprised both of 
norms and methods to forming, assessing, and relating beliefs (such as Observation, Induction, Modus 
Ponens, Revelation) and propositions whose truth is presupposed in the rational and epistemic 
justification of beliefs. Additionally, if an epistemic system’s elements are their hinges, and the latter are 
the grounds on which justification for belief depends on, then two epistemic systems are different 
when a difference in their hinges leads to justifying opposing beliefs.   
This last point is particularly relevant for our discussion of the relationship between hinge 
epistemology and the kind of relativism sketched in the introduction. It is an empirical fact that there 
are and have been different sets of belief systems that were supported by different hinges. For a subject 
matter X, here and now there are some who form beliefs on the basis of what they observe, and there 
are others who form beliefs about X on the basis of what they read in a sacred book. And across 
cultures and ages there is even more variation. Thus, hinge epistemology may accept Pluralism: people 
differ not only in what they believe, but also in what they take to be the justification and starting points 
of their beliefs. That is, there are different sets of hinges. But if there are different sets of hinges, we 
should expect that there are hinge disagreements. These are disagreements about what to believe and are 
rooted in differences in the hinges that comprise epistemic practices.11 Given that hinge disagreements 
involve differences in the justification of beliefs, when two sets of hinges differ in what they take as 
unjustifiable and unjustified (that is, one of them holds fixed a hinge that the other does not) then they 
are two different epistemic systems.  
Thus far, I haven’t said anything contentious in the context of hinge epistemology. Is there 
something else in hinge epistemology that leads it to relativism? Incommensurability can be 
 
11 In order to be in a hinge disagreement, the parties in a dispute need not disagree explicitly over hinges. Hinge 
disagreements are disagreements rooted in differences in hinges, and not in the conscious dispute over what are 
the right hinges of a given epistemic practice. On the possibility and intelligibility of there being disagreement 
over hinges such as “there are physical objects”, see Coliva & Palmira (forthcoming). 
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motivated with what we have. Suppose there is a hinge disagreement between two different sets of 
hinges such as the well documented and discussed disagreement between Galileo and Bellarmine.12 As 
the dispute is normally described, Galileo and Bellarmine held different beliefs: the latter believed that 
the Earth was immobile at the center of the universe, whereas the former believed that the Earth 
moved on its own axis and around the Sun. Purportedly, they also held different methods to justify 
their respective beliefs about the positions and movements of planets: Bellarmine endorsed Revelation, 
whereas Galileo rejected it and held Observation. Key to their dispute is that Bellarmine considered it 
unjustified to use only Observation to form beliefs about the Earth’s movement, while Galileo took as 
unjustified the relying on Scripture to decide what is true about celestial bodies. Additionally, any 
attempt by either party to justify the validity of his own methods and norms would either apply the 
deliverances of the methods at issue or make use of other parts of the epistemic system whose 
justification was in doubt.  
 How can this lead to incommensurability? As it was mentioned, hinge epistemology holds that 
hinges are unjustified and unjustifiable within the epistemic system they belong to. If Bellarmine’s 
hinges cannot be justified within his own epistemic system, they cannot be justified within Galileo’s 
epistemic system either, and vice versa. Both epistemic systems are mutually exclusive and closed to 
each other. The upshot is that in the context of their disagreement, Bellarmine is not in a position to 
accept Galileo’s justification for the belief that the Earth moves, since Galileo cannot in principle justify 
the hinges (say, Observation) that generate and justify such a belief.13 Thus, from the fact that hinges 
are unjustified and unjustifiable, it follows that in cases of hinge disagreement the parties cannot be 
epistemically and neutrally convinced, since they are blind to each other’s hinges. Furthermore, if they 
are blind to how the other party is justified to form a certain belief they disagree with, then their dispute 
is incommensurable.  
 
12 A classic discussion of this disagreement in the context of epistemic relativism is Rorty (1979). See also 
Boghossian (2006), and Seidel (2014). Cf. Kinzel & Kusch (2017). As cases like this are commonly discussed in 
the literature about epistemic relativism, I should clarify that this is a go-to case study from both sides of the 
debate: relativists appeal to it to motivate the argument from incommensurability, whereas anti-relativistic strategies 
normally show why and how a non-relativistic reading of the case is more compelling. This means that the case 
neither proves relativism right nor wrong, nor entails that the different arguments in favor or against epistemic 
relativism should speak to Galileo and Bellarmine’s particular dispute. The use of the case, both in this paper and 
in the literature, assumes just this much: if an epistemological theory predicts that epistemic relativism from 
incommensurability is true or false, then it should show that (and how) it is true or false of the kind of disputes 
exemplified by Galileo and Bellarmine.  
13 For ease of exposition, I am simplifying matters a little here. For strictly speaking, there was no observational 
and available proof or demonstration that the Earth moves at the time of Galileo and Bellarmine’s dispute (cf. 
Graney, 2011). More concretely, if Galileo’s hinges are unjustified even for himself, they are also unjustified for 
any other set of hinges (such as Bellarmine’s) that conflicts with Galileo’s. 
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I shall say more about Galileo and Bellarmine’s below, but for the moment let me just note that 
we have the elements to commit hinge epistemology not only to incommensurability, but also to Equal 
validity. Some say that equal validity is entailed by incommensurability (cf. Carter 2017): if hinge 
disagreements are not neutrally and epistemically resolvable, epistemic systems are not to be ranked, at 
least not by their epistemic merits or credentials (cf. Coliva forthcoming-a).  
If this is the case, we have a prima facie reason to think that hinge epistemology is a relativistic 
epistemology. Since this form of relativism, besides worrisome, seems to be too quick, hinge 
epistemologists debate whether the theses of dependence and pluralism actually entail 
incommensurability. Even though hinge epistemologists grant that the dependence and locality of our 
practices of justification can vary across different epistemic systems, they think that this does not imply 
a radical variability that gives rise to an impossibility to rationally resolve hinge disagreements. This 
avoidance of relativism depends on an account of what hinges are. The hinge epistemologist needs to 
defend an account of hinges that does not license incommensurability.14 Let’s consider two noteworthy 
efforts towards that direction: the acceptance view and the non-doxastic view. 
3 Two attempts to close the door on epistemic relativism  
The acceptance and non-doxastic accounts of hinges share this idea: incommensurability is false 
because hinge disagreements are epistemically and rationally resolvable, and they are rationally 
resolvable because all epistemic systems share the same background to which any putative hinge 
disagreement can be, by epistemic means, traced back.    
3.1 The acceptance account  
Let’s consider again Galileo and Bellarmine’s disagreement. The latter, unlike the former, forms and 
justify beliefs about the movements and locations of heavenly bodies according to Revelation. If 
Revelation is part of the building blocks of Bellarmine’s epistemic practices in the same way that 
Observation is of Galileo’s, it seems that their disagreement is not only a case of pluralism, but also of 
incommensurability. Given that Revelation is for Bellarmine what Observation is for Galileo, there is 
no rational and neutral way to determine which one of these methods is justified.   
Annalisa Coliva (2010) argues that the relativist is reasoning too quick and that a relativistic 
interpretation of the kind of disagreements exemplified by Galileo and Bellarmine is not compelling. To 
begin with, Coliva doubts whether these disagreements actually entail pluralism. Roughly, that 
Bellarmine forms beliefs according to Revelation does not mean that his is an epistemic practice 
 
14 An exception is Williams (2007). He thinks that blocking Equal validity is sufficient to refute relativism. 
Pritchard (2011) criticizes Williams on this score. 
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alternative to Galileo’s, least that such a practice is deviant enough from Galileo’s to motivate the claim 
that they subscribe two radically different epistemic systems. Forming beliefs according to Revelation 
does not constitute an independent and different epistemic system, because Revelation is carried out 
thanks to Observation. For instance, in order to read and interpret the Scripture, Bellarmine should use 
his perceptual faculties, rely on them, as well as form beliefs and reason according to Induction and 
Modus Ponens. Seen from this perspective, Coliva suggests, Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s respective 
systems of beliefs do not seem to encompass two radically different epistemic systems. Rather, it seems 
that Bellarmine’s Revelation “would just be a piece of, as it were, ‘primitive’ Science [and] can’t be used 
to support the idea that we are actually confronted with a different system of justification but only to 
maintain the view that our system of justification may evolve through time” (Coliva, 2010, 8-9). 
If pluralism is false of the kind of disagreements exemplified by Galileo and Bellarmine’s 
dispute, the thesis of incommensurability does not arise. Coliva, furthermore, not only says that 
incommensurability is unmotivated, but also that it is false. She says that there is just one universal 
epistemic system which is encompassed by more basic and fundamental methods and norms, such as 
Observation, Induction, and Modus Ponens.15 In this way, if all epistemic systems presuppose the 
building blocks of the one system of justification, then hinge disagreements can be rationally resolved 
when traced back to those basic methods and norms. In the case at hand, Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s 
epistemic systems are commensurable in the sense that Revelation is just a deviation from the right 
methods of the one epistemic system; Revelation exemplifies a pre-scientific way of forming beliefs that 
could rationally evolve to a stage in which it can be completely consistent with the methods employed 
by modern science.  
Turn now to the account of hinges, and hinge-attitudes, that underlies Coliva’s proposal of a 
rational resolution of a hinge disagreement.  
First, as already suggested, Coliva’s hinges are necessary and constitutive of epistemic systems. 
Those are very general and abstract propositions, norms and methods that must be presupposed in any 
cognitive engagement with the world: if an epistemic practice A cannot be carried out without 
presupposing B, and B expresses either a very general proposition, or a basic method of belief 
formation that does not depend on any other method or norm, then B is a hinge. For Coliva this means 
that Revelation is not a hinge of any epistemic practice, since one can drop off Revelation and still be in 
a position to engage cognitively with the movements and locations of heavenly bodies (cf. 2015, 141). 
Furthermore, Coliva thinks that the possibility of alternative hinges (and with them the soundness of 
 
15 A similar point is made by Boghossian (2006, 103). Roughly, if everyone has to use their perception to acquire 
information about the world and relate the contents of their perception according to general principles such as 
Induction or Modus Ponens, then there are no radically different epistemic systems and hence no 
incommensurability. See also Seidel (2014). 
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relativism) depends on the possibility of there being epistemic systems carried out without the hinges 
that are necessary for our epistemic system. But, according to Coliva, this is not only highly implausible 
but also misguided, since it is unconceivable to engage cognitively with the world without presupposing 
that there is a physical external world or that I am prima facie justified in believing the deliverances of my 
senses. Insofar as the one epistemic system of justification does not exhibit such a radical deviation, 
there is no radical variation of epistemic systems that could motivate incommensurability.  
Second, Coliva conceives of hinges as propositions (2015, 33 and ff.). This involves two things. 
On the one hand, they have a content, or convey information, about the “abstract space of reasons” in 
which epistemic justification takes place (more on this below). On the other hand, hinges are graspable 
by a doxastic attitude which Coliva calls acceptance or assumption. Accepting a hinge is in turn understood 
as a doxastic propositional attitude, in the sense that a subject (i) takes the content of the hinge to be 
true (Coliva, 2018) and (ii) is in a position to successfully participate in epistemic practices that 
presuppose the hinge. S accepts the existence of the external world if it is committed in her “thoughts 
and actions to the existence of an external world” (Coliva 2015, 38; cf. 35). This commitment in 
thought and action does not require having or consciously entertaining the appropriate concepts. It 
suffices that the agent “said things, such as, ‘The red table is in the kitchen’, while he is not there seeing 
it” (2015, 35). Importantly, despite being a kind of doxastic attitude towards a proposition, acceptances 
are not meant to be justified. They do not aim at truth or justification, since they are the necessary 
conditions to judge what is true and justified.  
Coliva’s response to relativism consists then in contending that pluralism is false, for any 
disagreeing parties in a dispute make use of the same basic methods and norms to which their 
disagreement can be traced back. This in turn entails that incommensurability is false. In our case at 
hand, we have then that Galileo and Bellarmine are not in a hinge disagreement, and that Bellarmine 
does not really accept Revelation as a hinge. Rather, he might be confused about how to direct the basic 
methods and constitutive hinges of his epistemic practice. In the reminder of this subsection, I shall 
mention why this response is insufficient to avoid relativism.16 
If the acceptance account seeks to deny pluralism, that should follow from the account of 
hinges that it delivers. In particular, the acceptance account should establish that methods of belief 
formation such as Revelation are neither basic for any given epistemic system, nor the object of 
acceptance (in the sense of not being presupposed in an agent’s thoughts and actions). The acceptance 
account of hinges, in order to avoid a commitment to epistemic relativism, should deliver on these two 
things. However, the relativist has at least two reasons to think that, in the case of Bellarmine, an 
 
16 I should mention that my target is not Coliva’s particular acceptance account, but rather the prospects of a 
conception of hinges as accepted propositions to avoid epistemic relativism from incommensurability. 
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acceptance account of hinges as the one sketched above does not entirely preclude Revelation from 
being a hinge.17  
First, Revelation is a hinge because Bellarmine does accept Revelation as a hinge. Bellarmine thinks 
and acts as if he takes Revelation to be a valid method of belief formation, even if unbeknownst to him 
that method happens to be unreliable. Notice that, as it was mentioned, acceptance as an attitude does not 
require anything but acting and thinking as if the proposition or method endorsed is taken as true or 
reliable. Thus, as long as Bellarmine’s endorsing of Revelation is manifested in his actions and thoughts 
even when he could be wrong in so acting and thinking, then –so the relativist contends– we can say 
that he accepts Revelation.  
Second, Revelation is a hinge because it is a basic method of justification for Bellarmine. As it was 
mentioned, an acceptance account considers that Revelation, in order to be a genuine hinge, must be 
carried out without presupposing any other method. Thus, if Bellarmine should use the deliverances of 
his senses to carry out Revelation, then Observation, and not Revelation, is a hinge. But the relativist 
thinks that this is debatable. Some have questioned whether it is true that the fact that all of us use our 
senses to engage cognitively with the world entails that there is just one epistemic system.18 For one 
thing, even though Bellarmine needs to use his eyes in order to read and interpret the Scripture, this 
does not mean that Revelation is justified by Observation. The senses do not pay any justificatory role: 
what the Scripture says is not justified because Bellarmine can read it, but because it is presupposed in 
his overall epistemic system, despite allegations to the contrary. Bellarmine accepts Revelation, and acts 
as if what the Scripture says is true, not because his eyes (or his sense organs in general) so lead him to 
believe.19 Rather, Bellarmine accepts Revelation even though other methods conflict with its 
 
17 It is important to clarify that the relativist is not saying that the nature of hinges as accepted propositions is 
determined by the contingencies of Bellarmine’s and Galileo’s dispute. Rather, the relativist contends that the 
acceptance account cannot avoid relativism by simply insisting that methods of belief formation like Revelation 
are not hinges, because (so argues the relativist) Bellarmine’s epistemic practices can be interpreted as if 
Revelation is a hinge, which is what the relativist needs in order to commit the acceptance account to epistemic 
relativism. 
18 Cf. Ashton (forthcoming), Kusch (2016a, 2017a, 2017b), Bland (2018, chs.8 and 9). I discuss Bland’s solution to 
the problem of relativism in Piedrahita (2020). 
19 Consider what Bellarmine thought about Galileo’s discoveries and Copernicanism in general: 
if there were a true demonstration that the sun is at the center of the world and the earth in the third 
heaven, and that the sun does not circle the earth but the earth circles the sun, then one would have to proceed 
with great care in explaining the Scriptures that appear contrary, and say rather that we do not understand them than that 
what is demonstrated is false.” (“Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini (12 April 1615)” in Finocchiaro 1989, 68, 
Emphasis added). 
The relativist can contend that the emphasized consequent suggests that Revelation was a hinge for Bellarmine, 
since its validity did not depend on the deliverances of Observation or of any other method. Furthermore, 
Bellarmine’s apparent reluctance to give up either Scripture or ‘what is demonstrated’ by Copernicanism suggests 
that Revelation and Observation were independent of each other and there was no hierarchy between them. For 
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deliverances: he is willing to consider as unjustified any piece of observational information that is 
unjustified in light of the Scripture. Furthermore, Bellarmine is not willing to justify the validity of 
Revelation by appealing to any other method. The relativist thus insists that Revelation is a hinge, even 
if the one who accepts Revelation uses, like the naturalist, her eyes to carry out that method of belief 
formation.  
Relatedly, remember that the acceptance account says that pluralism is false because Galileo 
and Bellarmine share some hinges. The relativist alleges that the acceptance account cannot avoid 
pluralism by making that claim. The possibility of a hinge disagreement, and thus of pluralism, does not 
depend on whether Bellarmine uses Observation and inductive reasoning when reading the Scripture. 
Rather, it depends on whether there are two different methods doing different justificatory work for 
different sets of beliefs. And Galileo and Bellarmine’s dispute exhibits a situation in which the 
justificatory work is done by different and irreducible methods. Both Bellarmine and Galileo rely on 
Observation, but only the latter uses it as a source of justification. There is then no apparent reason to 
deny Bellarmine the right to accepting Revelation as a genuine hinge and to concede that he is with 
Galileo in a hinge disagreement.20  
The acceptance account then cannot easily avoid pluralism. Can it avoid incommensurability? 
If it cannot, relativism ensues. According to the acceptance account, rational resolution of a hinge 
disagreement is possible by appealing to the basic, constitutive hinges of every cognitive engagement 
with the world: Observation, Induction, Modus Ponens and Deduction, and general propositions such 
as “There is an external world” or “My sense organs are mostly reliable”. One of the virtues of the 
acceptance account is that its hinges carry propositional content and are graspable by a doxastic attitude 
of acceptance. Another virtue of the acceptance account is that, considered as the constitutive 
assumptions of any epistemic system, the basic hinges are neutral: if they are part of every epistemic 
system, then they constitute a common ground to which both parties can appeal in order to reach an 
agreement. This makes hinges something that agents like Galileo and Bellarmine can argue for, defend, 
and even comprehend, in a way that both parties can reach a rational resolution to their disagreement. 
 
instance, Bellarmine takes it that the truth of Copernicanism does not debunk Revelation, but rather it calls for a 
more careful interpretation of Scripture. In this way, both hinges are independent in that even if Bellarmine was 
open to concede that the deliverances of Observation could affect his carrying out of Revelation (i.e., he should 
have to proceed with care in explaining Scriptures), this does not mean that the latter’s justification depends on the 
former. 
20 It could be objected, against the relativist and on behalf of the acceptance account, that Galileo and 
Bellarmine’s is not a disagreement about hinges, for are they not merely disagreeing about very entrenched 
(maybe irrational) beliefs? The relativist responds that most interlocutors in the debate about hinge disagreements 
agree that situations such as Galileo and Bellarmine’s is not merely a disagreement over what to believe, but rather 
over what justifies our beliefs. And hinges, by definition, are the building blocks of epistemic justification. Thus, 
to say that Galileo and Bellarmine’s is not a hinge disagreement, but a mere disagreement over beliefs, would 
assume that Revelation is not a hinge, which is precisely what the acceptance account cannot easily avoid. 
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The acceptance account thus predicts that even though Galileo cannot justify Observation, and 
Bellarmine cannot justify Revelation, both parties can rationally engage in a process whose outcome is 
Bellarmine’s dropping of Revelation and acceptance of Observation. Notwithstanding these virtues, the 
relativist still has reservations and offers the following three challenges to the acceptance account.  
First, regarding what hinges are, even though they are propositions, it is not clear that their content 
is adequately discriminative. In other words, the common, basic, and universal hinges do not seem to 
determine who is right and who is wrong.21 The relativist does not mean that Observation does not 
favor the use of telescopes over the use of the Scripture when one does astronomy. Rather, the point is 
that Observation does not trump Revelation from both parties’ perspectives, which the relativist claims 
as a point for herself.22 For, so the relativist claims, if Bellarmine has any reason to think that a defense 
of Observation over Revelation begs the question against his epistemic system, that defense despite 
being discriminative, is not sufficiently neutral. Thus, following Adam Carter, the relativist says that 
there must be a discriminating condition for rational resolution of hinge disagreements: 
Discriminating: for there to be rational resolution of a hinge disagreement between two 
epistemic systems, the systems’ common hinges should be discriminative in the sense that they 
will favor one epistemic system over the other in a non-question begging way (cf. Carter 
2017).23 
Does the acceptance account of basic hinges meet the Discriminating condition? Take, for example, the 
tautological norm that is (allegedly) shared by all epistemic systems: infer p from p. This norm, though 
basic and universal, would not be discriminative to help rationally settle a debate as to whether p is the 
case (cf. Carter forthcoming). Or consider the basic method of belief formation, Perception, which is 
presumably constitutive of any (human) epistemic system: if it seems to me that p, and further 
conditions obtain, then I am rationally justified in believing that p. Is this method, albeit neutral and 
adequately graspable through acceptance, appropriately discriminative? The relativist answers that we 
have reason to think that it is not, since if we imagine two parties disagreeing as to whether p is the 
case, this method (which merely tells how to relate the contents of one’s seemings with one’s beliefs) is 
irrelevant to decide who is right and who is wrong. 
 
21 This critical observation has been raised, in a different context, by Adam Carter (2017) against Pritchard’s 
account of hinges and rational resolution of disagreements, to which I will turn in the next sub-section. 
22Again, remember that Galileo and Bellarmine’s (or a structurally similar) case does not render epistemic 
relativism from incommensurability neither true nor false. The relativist is not bootstrapping her position from an 
interpretation of the case. At this point, all the relativist contends against the acceptance account is that if the 
hinges of such an account can save us from epistemic relativism, then it has to be shown how and why Galileo and 
Bellarmine’s case is not well suited to a relativistic reading.  
23 Carter also talks in terms of Archimedean metanorms as the ones that can meet the Discriminating condition 
(Carter forthcoming). 
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Thus, we find that the acceptance account, while prima facie allowing for the possibility of 
rationally resolving hinge disagreements, faces the worry of offering hinges that, albeit neutral, are too 
general to be dialectically effective.24 How can Galileo persuade Bellarmine to abandon his acceptance 
of Revelation and to accept Observation? If Galileo alleges that Observation, and not Revelation, is the 
reliable method by which beliefs about the movements of heavenly bodies are justified, Bellarmine 
would need a further reason to accept such a claim. But a justification for the reliability of Observation 
would make use of the deliverances of Observation, which is precisely what is at stake in this dispute. 
Such a justification would be question begging or, at least, dialectically ineffective (that is, Bellarmine 
may not accept such an argument without any epistemic fault on his part).  
Secondly, Galileo cannot justify his use of Observation in a non-circular way. Galileo can undertake a 
more dialectically compelling strategy, such as showing Bellarmine that from his own viewpoint 
Observation has to be the starting point of his coming to be justified in forming beliefs about the 
external world in general. So, contends Galileo, if Bellarmine accepts Observation when it comes to 
non-astronomical matters, he has prima facie an epistemic reason to accept Observation when forming 
beliefs about the movements and locations of heavenly bodies. The relativist interprets the situation 
differently though. She contends that Bellarmine can argue that he is not challenging the all things 
considered reliability of Observation. He is instead opting for restricting the application of 
Observation, which (according to the Scripture) is not a reliable method to form perceptual beliefs 
about distant physical objects.25 Without the truth revealed in the Scripture, he might say, there is no 
 
24 Someone might think that this begs the question against Coliva’s view. It could be that hinges do not meet the 
Discriminating condition because they (as the necessary presuppositions of any epistemic practice) are not 
supposed to decide who is right between Galileo and Bellarmine, given that Galileo and Bellarmine do not 
embrace fundamentally different epistemic systems (cf. Coliva forthcoming-a; Baghramian & Coliva 2019, 180 
and ff.). I find this rejoinder problematic. First, the relativist is not committed to (and her position does not 
depend on) any view about hinges or about Galileo and Bellarmine’s case. All she is saying is that under the 
acceptance account of hinges, Galileo and Bellarmine’s case can be interpreted along relativistic lines, which is 
precisely what the acceptance account seems unable to avoid. Second, the rejoinder is based on the idea that 
Bellarmine’s embracing of Revelation is not a hinge acceptance. To this, the relativist has at her disposal two lines 
of argumentation: first, that in light of the acceptance view we can allow Bellarmine the possibility of accepting 
Revelation as a hinge, since from Bellarmine’s perspective Revelation is the object of acceptance and is basic. Second, 
that even if we grant that Revelation is not a hinge, we can ask: how can Bellarmine be rationally convinced that he 
should drop Revelation and accept Observation to form beliefs about the movements of heavenly bodies? The 
acceptance account should be able to say how rational resolution of hinge disagreement is possible, even if there 
are no radically different epistemic systems. 
25 In this respect, Christopher Graney says: 
… Bellarmine had seen the Moon and Venus through a telescope for himself. At that time he had 
written to the Jesuit professors of the Roman College to confirm that what Galileo had discovered was 
real, and not merely an appearance (…) / Through a letter (…) Bellarmine expressed a willingness to 
listen to Galileo’s ideas. But he also expressed caution in regard to interpreting as simply accommodating 
human perception those scriptural passages that speak of the Sun’s motion: “This is not something to 
jump into, just as one ought not to jump hurriedly into condemning any one of these opinions.” (2011, 
71-72). 
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reliable way of directing our sense organs towards very distant astronomical objects. Thus, argues the 
relativist, by considering Revelation as a necessary condition of carrying out epistemic practices, 
Bellarmine accepts Revelation, takes it as a reliable method, and in such a situation he could be rational 
in not accepting an argument that tries to deny the restricted application of Observation and the general 
reliability of Revelation. Why is Bellarmine rational in doing so? Because, answers the relativist, he 
hasn’t been given an independent reason to think that Observation should not be restricted, that is, he 
hasn’t been given a non-circular argument against the reliability of Revelation (cf. Piedrahita 2020). 
Therefore, again, the hinges offered by the acceptance account are not enough to lead both parties to a 
rational resolution of their hinge disagreement, which the relativist finds as a welcome result.26 
Thirdly, basic, constitutive hinges do not point to any fact of the matter regarding Galileo and Bellarmine’s 
dispute. We can imagine Galileo inviting Bellarmine to look at his telescope and asking him to consider 
the following line of reasoning (which is an instantiation of a basic epistemic method): if it seems that 
the Earth moves, and further conditions obtain, then you (Bellarmine) are justified in believing that the 
Earth moves. The relativist might agree with the picture but contend that the reasoning in question, 
which instantiates the neutral and basic method of Perception, is not discriminative enough such that 
Bellarmine can come to form a belief as to whether the Earth moves from his perceiving that the Earth 
moves. For one thing, the relativist reminds us that you cannot perceive the Earth’s motion just by 
looking through a telescope. Complicated calculations and inferences regarding the composition and 
movements of light and other celestial bodies have to be entertained before you can conclude, on the 
basis of what seems to be the case by looking through a telescope, that the Earth moves. Thus, it seems 
that basic methods like Perception, or Observation, need further theoretical assumptions in order to 
justify one of the parties in the dispute. As long as the other party might have no reason from within 
his own epistemic system to embrace those further theoretical assumptions,27 then those basic 
methods, albeit neutral and constitutive of any epistemic system, fail to be discriminative and thus to 
allow for rational resolution of hinge disagreements. 
It seems that the acceptance account’s hinges do not close the door on the relativist. 
 
26 A possible rejoinder from Baghramian & Coliva (2019, 182 and ff.) contends that Galileo and Bellarmine 
disagree over non-fundamental epistemic methods, such as Observation-restricted-to-the-heavens. That is, their 
disagreement is about the correct application of basic and fundamental methods such as Observation. If this is so, 
theirs is not a hinge disagreement and there is in principle a rational path to solve their dispute! This rejoinder is 
not very helpful to the acceptance account, for the problem is that there is no non-circular way to convince 
Bellarmine of the correct application of Observation and thus Bellarmine is rational to stick to his guns even in 
his restricted application of Observation – and this is troublesome enough for the possibility of there being a 
rational resolution of a (restricted)-hinge disagreement.  
27 According to Graney (2011), the Copernican system was at odds with the physic of the seventeenth century, 
whereas Tycho Brahe’s geocentric model of the universe, “was identical to the Copernican world system both 
from the standpoint of mathematics and from the standpoint of astronomical observations” (72). 
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3.2 The non-doxastic account  
Duncan Pritchard (2011, 2015, 2018b) also offers a strategy to block relativism by proposing an 
account of hinges that avoids incommensurability. Pritchard agrees with Coliva that hinges are 
propositions. Unlike Coliva, however, he does not think that our attitude toward hinges is a doxastic 
attitude. More specifically, he denies that we believe hinges, in the sense of believing that is sensitive to 
reasons and evidence and is thus necessary for knowledge. S believes that p in this sense if S has a 
propositional attitude towards p that could be rationally grounded.28 As it turns out, however, Pritchard 
contends that the attitude we have, if any, towards hinges is not like this; such an attitude is not sensitive 
to, nor grounded in, reasons. Instead, Pritchard conceives of hinges as the object of an attitude he dubs 
commitment, which should rule out the idea that our hinges are justified, justifiable or even knowable 
(they are animal, or simply constitutive, of our cognitively engaging with the world). 
Even though hinges are not the objects of belief, and there could be variations in the hinges 
that different agents and communities embrace, Pritchard argues that this by itself does not entail 
incommensurability. The problem of epistemic relativism, according to Pritchard, is not whether there 
are different epistemic systems, or whether we can justify to others the basic hinge commitments of our 
epistemic practices. Rather, he takes relativism to be worrisome insofar as it implies that there is no 
rational path to resolve a hinge disagreement; more generally, in order to refute relativism we must 
show that our beliefs and hinge commitments can change rationally. Importantly, Pritchard thinks that 
the key to blocking incommensurability and thus defusing relativism is to understand how one’s hinges 
rationally change over time (2018b). If it is possible for one’s hinges to rationally change over time, there 
can be rational resolution of hinge disagreements, to the extent that the rational resolution of a hinge 
disagreement is an instance of the general phenomenon of there being a rational change in one’s hinges 
over time. 
 In order to avoid incommensurability, Pritchard’s account begins by noticing that hinge 
commitments have a common core, a common theme, that is codified in other more particular and 
variable hinge commitments. Pritchard dubs this common core the uber hinge, which refers to a 
fundamental and overarching commitment of every epistemic system and every epistemic agent. This is 
a commitment to not consider oneself, and one’s epistemic practices, as radically, systematically, and 
fundamentally mistaken in one’s beliefs and enquiries.29 Arguably, the uber hinge is constitutive of any 
cognitive engagement with the world – you would not get very far with your beliefs, or would not have 
any beliefs at all, if you were to think that you are radically and fundamentally deceived in your 
 
28 For more on Pritchard’s notion of belief, see Pritchard (2015, 90ff.; 2018a, 24-27). 
29 Pritchard (2015, 105; cf. 2011, 282-283; 2018b, 4) 
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inquiries. Importantly, this uber hinge should be distinguished from the particular hinge commitments 
that a person, or a community, may embrace at a particular time. A particular hinge commitment is the 
particular codification of that uber hinge in a given epistemic system. For instance, although Revelation 
and Observation seem to be different hinges that justify different, and opposing, beliefs, they have in 
common that every epistemic agent who (sincerely) commits to either of them is also committed to not 
consider herself as radically and fundamentally mistaken in her enquiries.30  
The last point merits to mention that the uber hinge commitment is not only constitutive of 
any epistemic system, but it also secures that there is a significant overlap in the hinge commitments of 
different epistemic systems. If all epistemic systems, despite exhibiting differences, are structured by 
hinges that codify the conviction that we are not fundamentally mistaken in forming beliefs and 
conducting enquiries, it is expected that there will be common beliefs and common particular hinges 
across different epistemic systems. This common background also allows for there to be genuine and 
intelligible disagreement between two epistemic systems in dispute (cf. Pritchard 2011). If their 
disagreement and dispute count as rational and intelligible, both parties should share at least this 
commitment to not being radically and fundamentally deceived in their beliefs, and possibly other 
particular hinges that would promote their mutual understanding.  
As it should be clear, however, this by itself does not block incommensurability. 
Incommensurability entails that there is no rational resolution of hinge disagreements, which could still 
be true even if all epistemic systems have beliefs and hinges in common. Thus, the uber hinge and the 
common overlap in different hinge commitments constitute one of the two elements of Pritchard’s 
account of rational resolution of disagreements.  
The second element is the relationship between the uber hinge, the particular hinges, and the rest 
of beliefs that comprise an epistemic system. As mentioned, part of Pritchard’s account is that only 
beliefs are directly responsive to rational considerations. So, if the problem of incommensurability is 
how to make room for a rational change in one’s hinge commitments, Pritchard has to argue that hinge 
commitments change via the rational change of beliefs. That is, Pritchard proposes that one’s particular 
hinges rationally change over time when one’s beliefs also change, given that only the latter are 
responsive to rational considerations (Pritchard, 2018b, 7; 2018a, 32). How is a hinge commitment 
responsive to rational considerations? Pritchard’s answer is that the hinge commitment changes when 
(i) there is a change in one’s wider set of beliefs (acquiring, dropping, or otherwise revising one’s previous 
beliefs)  and (ii) such a change of beliefs leads to a change in the particular hinge commitments, given 
 
30 In the discussion, we are assuming that epistemic systems, and enquiries in general, aim at getting at the truth. If 
someone insincerely embraces Observation, it is not clear what propositional attitude she would have towards the 
deliverances of Observation, or whether such a propositional attitude aims at truth. 
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that the latter are the manifestation of one’s uber hinge commitment. In other words, a change of 
particular hinge commitments is a function of the changes of one’s beliefs given one’s uber hinge. 
Assuming that (i) and (ii) constitute a rational process, there is no reason to deny that such a change in 
hinge commitments is rational too. Thus, hinge commitments are after all somewhat responsive to 
rational considerations and hence can be rationally revisable.  
Pritchard illustrates this by presenting a hinge disagreement between two subjects, Adam and 
Eve. Adam believes that the Earth is less than 10,000 years old. He “was raised in a religious 
community which takes the Bible as literal truth. He thus has a wealth of testimony from those around 
him that he should believe likewise” (Pritchard, 2011, 268). There is also Eve, who believes that the 
Earth is much more than 10,000 years old and relies on scientific evidence whose basis she initially took 
from the testimony of her parents, teachers, and Geology books. How can they rationally resolve this 
hinge disagreement? Adam and Eve embrace different particular hinge commitments that are 
nonetheless the codifications of the same uber hinge, i.e., their commitment to not consider themselves 
and the members of their epistemic communities to be radically and fundamentally deceived in 
adopting certain sources of information as reliable. That is, they disagree about the epistemic authority 
of different kinds of books, but not about the epistemic authority of trusting what one’s community 
takes as justified. Now, Pritchard contends, Adam and Eve’s hinge disagreement is rationally resolvable 
when one of the parties (e.g., Adam) comes to re-codify their uber hinge commitment in the light of 
rational considerations that make him change his wider set of beliefs: 
There will always be a rational way of engaging with the other party by looking to common 
ground (common beliefs, common hinges), and using that common ground to try to change 
their wider set of beliefs. If this is achieved, then over time one can change the other person’s 
hinge commitments. More precisely, as their wider set of beliefs changes, so too will the 
specific hinge commitments which manifest their über hinge commitment (which never 
changes) (Pritchard, 2018b, 7; 2018a, 33-34). 
This means that hinges are indirectly responsive to rational considerations: they rationally change when 
the wider set of beliefs rationally changes. In such a case, the particular hinge commitment (that the 
Scripture is a reliable source of information) becomes an ordinary belief: “the agents concerned (one of 
them anyway) will over time cease to regard a certain proposition as codifying the hinge conviction but 
as rather being a belief that is open to epistemic evaluation in the normal way” (Pritchard 2011, 283; cf. 
2018b, 7). Having an ordinary belief, Adam may just disbelieve that the Scripture is a reliable source of 
information and come to form beliefs about the distant past using the same methods that Eve uses – 
that is, Adam’s uber hinge commitment is no longer manifested in the commitment to the 
trustworthiness of the Scripture.  
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Although Pritchard’s non-doxastic account nicely points towards the direction and dynamics 
that the rational resolution of a hinge disagreement might take, the relativist still has some things to say 
which ultimately question the purported success of this account in blocking incommensurability and 
responding to relativism.31 
First, although the existence of the uber hinge could show that pluralism is false, this in itself 
does not meet the Discriminating condition which, as the relativist claimed before, is necessary for 
rational resolution of hinge disagreements. The relativist may contend that the process that Pritchard 
describes of a rational change in one’s hinge commitments does not meet the Discriminating condition, 
unless it is shown that a recourse to the uber hinge in the context of a hinge disagreement shows how 
the parties can rationally reach an agreement (cf. Carter 2017). Suppose that Adam (or Bellarmine), 
after meeting Eve (or Galileo), comes to entertain this thought: “I am committed to avoiding radical 
and systematic deception in my overall epistemic system, and yet I haven’t been given a neutral, non-
circular reason to believe that I am the one deceived when I commit myself to form beliefs according 
to Scripture”. Is Adam being irrational? It seems that he is not irrational in sticking to his guns. The 
recourse to an uber hinge and to common beliefs is incomplete, since the proposed candidates to avoid 
radical divergence between epistemic systems and to secure rational resolution of hinge disagreements 
are too general to show how their mere existence is sufficient to favor one party over the other. 
Now, this criticism might appear uncompelling, since Pritchard’s account is meant to show that 
it is possible for particular hinges to rationally change over time. His argument contends that rational 
resolutions of hinge disagreements are possible, even if in the practice this is difficult to attain. 
Certainly, the fact that the uber hinge is too general to meet the Discriminating condition seems an 
empirical or practical matter, such that even if it is rational for an agent to re-codify her uber hinge in 
light of contrary evidence to her wider set of beliefs, it might be practically impossible for her to change 
her beliefs and thus the codification of the uber hinge.  
The relativist may respond that even if the recodification of the uber hinge could occur through 
a rational process, it is so only if circular justification is allowed, which is dialectically ineffective in the 
context of a hinge disagreement. Consider again Eve: she should use the common ground of beliefs to 
change Adam’s commitments, which is supposed to be accomplished by changing Adam’s wider set of 
beliefs. How can Eve change Adam’s wider set of beliefs? By telling Adam that his beliefs are false 
because they are formed through an unreliable method. This entails that Eve changes Adam’s wider set 
of beliefs by proving the reliability of science textbooks over bibles. But this will be dialectically 
 
31 Pritchard’s non-doxastic account of hinges has been recently discussed regarding its merits to actually solving 
one of the faces of the skeptical challenge (see Coliva (2018), Josep (2019), Nebel (2019), Simion et al. (2019), 
Zhang (2018)). My target is not Pritchard’s particular account, but rather the prospects of a conception of hinges 
as a-rational, non-doxastic commitments that can rationally change over time to respond to relativism.  
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ineffective, since any proof of the reliability of scientific textbooks will make use of what scientific 
textbooks say, which is precisely what is at issue in their disagreement. In other words, the general trust 
we have in our peers cannot be justified (because it is an uber hinge commitment), and a purported 
justification for the adoption of a particular codification of it (e.g. an epistemic justification of our trust 
in scientific textbooks) is deemed to be circular, since the justification of the reliability of a particular 
adoption of the uber hinge will make use of the deliverances of that particular way of codifying the 
uber hinge. But if the argument that Eve offers to Adam is circular and dialectically ineffective, Adam 
can rationally stick to his guns and refuse to change his wider set of beliefs and to recodify his uber 
hinge. If so, concludes the relativist, it is possible to rationally refuse to change one’s hinge commitments in the 
context of a hinge disagreement. If circular arguments have no rational force to someone who already 
rejects the presuppositions on which such arguments rest, then it seems that the uber hinge, by leading 
to circular justification for a particular recodification of it, fails to be rationally persuasive to at least one 
of the parties in a hinge disagreement.32 
Secondly, there seems to be a tension between Pritchard’s non-doxastic account of hinges and 
his proposal of rationally resolvable hinge disagreements. As it was mentioned, Pritchard thinks that 
particular hinges are responsive, at least indirectly, to rational considerations. The difference between 
direct and indirect reasons responsiveness consists in that, in the former case, reasons are given directly 
to the other party so as to change her belief, while the latter is meant to indicate a situation in which 
one of the parties appeals to the common ground (uber hinge and wider set of beliefs) in such a way 
that ‘over time’ the other party changes her hinge commitments. Now, the relativist asks: how can a 
belief change independently of a (prior) change in one’s hinge commitment? If the relation between 
hinge commitments and beliefs is one of justification (one’s beliefs are believed and justified given 
one’s hinges), how can one change one’s beliefs without already having occurred a change in one’s 
hinges? This would imply that a belief can change, so to say, ‘in the void’, and later on the hinge 
accommodates such a change by changing itself and thus being in harmony with the uber hinge. But if 
hinges allow us to judge what is true and what is false, it follows that a change in a belief would underlie 
a change in a hinge.  
To avoid these worries, Pritchard could say that the beliefs that change are those that are 
supported by the common ground between the two parties. Pritchard says on this score: “one should 
look for common ground, and use that common ground to change the person’s beliefs in relevant 
ways. If enough of those beliefs are changed, this could over time impact upon their hinge 
 
32 Pritchard could rejoin that this again shows that resolving a hinge disagreement is practically difficult. Note, 
however, that the argument just mentioned on behalf of the relativist does not appeal to practical or cognitive 
limitations (epistemic vices and biases, say), but to the epistemic possibility of Adam being rational in not changing 
his wider set of beliefs.  
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commitments” (2018a, 33-34). Maybe both parties can get to know each other, locate their shared 
beliefs and values, and then gradually reach an agreement about their beliefs about the world, which 
does not seem neither circular nor mysterious.  
However, and as Steven Bland (2018, 170-172) has suggested in a different context, if the 
particular hinge commitments are responsive to a change of beliefs, and those beliefs are common to 
both parties in a dispute, the relativist can now doubt whether this is really a case of hinge 
disagreement. If, on the one hand, the hinge commitment Observation is responsive to the wider set of 
beliefs and is grounded on the truth of those beliefs, then it is not clear why Observation is a hinge, 
since hinges are what grounds one’s beliefs and what provides justification for one’s beliefs. The 
question that the non-doxastic account leaves unanswered is: why to think that a commitment that 
changes in function of one’s beliefs is a hinge commitment? On the other hand, if the common ground 
guarantees that each party can rationally persuade the other just by appealing to the shared set of beliefs 
and values, does not this entail that both parties share the same epistemic system and that this is not a 
case of hinge disagreement? If the rational work is done by appealing to the common ground of beliefs, 
and this common ground has the power to change one party’s hinge commitments, then the relativist 
can agree that this is certainly a rational way of resolving a disagreement, but at the expense of not 
solving the incommensurability challenge, since now we have a reason to doubt whether both parties 
had different epistemic systems. This worry can be generalized in the following way. When it comes to 
blocking relativism, the thesis that hinges are not responsive to reasons has to allow for an indirect 
responsiveness to reasons via the wider set of beliefs. But if the rational resolution of a disagreement 
depends ultimately on what happens at the level of beliefs, then it is not clear whether this is a 
disagreement over hinges. And if this is not a disagreement over hinges, epistemic relativism (although 
avoided) has not been addressed. 
At the end, it seems that the non-doxastic account of hinges, by locating the exchange of 
reasons at the level of beliefs, either permits to describe cases of hinge disagreement in which one of 
the parties can be rational and at the same time stick to his guns, or allows for a possibility of rationally 
resolving a disagreement that the relativist may think begs the question against her, since the possibility 
described assumes that both disagreeing parties have a common background that suggests that both of 
them are actually operating within the same epistemic system. Either way, it is not clear whether the 
incommensurability thesis is refuted, either because the possibility of rationally sticking to one’s guns 
exacerbates the incommensurability, or because the relativistic challenge, instead of addressed, has been 
dismissed.  
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4 Opening the door to rational resolution of hinge disagreements 
We have seen two different accounts of hinges. Both say that hinges are propositions: they have a 
content and are graspable. The acceptance account, such as Coliva’s, says that hinges are the object of a 
doxastic-like attitude, such that hinges are taken as true when we act and think as if the proposition 
expressed by them is true. Alternatively, according to Pritchard, hinges are neither believed, nor 
accepted, but merely held as certain in such a way that we do not have reasons or justification for so 
being committed to them. I have presented some limitations that each account faces and in this section 
I shall argue that there is a way of developing an account of hinges that could avoid these worries and 
thus guarantee a rational path to resolve hinge disagreements. In particular, I propose that hinges must 
have the following three characteristics. 
First, the attitude towards hinges should not be aversive to rational considerations. This means 
setting aside a non-doxastic account of hinges. As we have seen, if part of the definition of what a 
hinge is excludes it from being susceptible to reasons, then it is difficult to show how a disagreement 
about what the right hinges are can be rationally and epistemically resolved. Thus, in the context of a 
hinge disagreement, hinges can be doubted and rationally grounded. 
Second, hinges should be understood as propositions, or as carrying information about the 
epistemic grounds in which justification, and our inquiries in general, take place. Importantly, this 
information is not empirical or subject to truth evaluation. To affirm or deny that there is an external 
world, or that the Earth has existed for a very long time, is to say something about our epistemic 
practices and the rest of our beliefs. So, when I say that hinges can be doubted and justified in the context 
of a hinge disagreement, I mean that we can doubt and justify our overall grip onto reality. For instance, to 
doubt the general validity of Observation is to call into question whether the epistemic practices that 
rest on this method are reliable. In this way, that hinges are propositions should make room for the idea 
that a thoughtful user of an epistemic system is in a position to recognize (more on this below) how 
firm or shaky is her cognitive engagement with the world. 
Third, the uber hinge that is constitutive of every epistemic system should rule out particular 
codifications or manifestations, even from the perspective of different sets of commitments. That is, 
even though hinge disagreements arise because there are different and inconsistent codifications of the 
uber hinge, there has to be a rational consideration available to both parties such that they recognize 
that both codifications should not be allowed and that they have the epistemic means to decide which 
codification of the uber hinge is the right one. In order to accomplish this without begging the question 
against one of the parties nor allowing for circular justification, the situation should be such that both 
parties, by reflecting on their particular hinge commitments in light of the uber hinge, could be in a 
position to determine which codification of the uber hinge should prevail. 
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Now, is this still a hinge epistemology? This worry might take two forms. One may suspect that 
these three characteristics take us too far from the notion of a hinge such that it is no longer clear 
whether I am entitled to use the terminology of hinge epistemology. However, notice that hinge 
epistemology is not a monolithic set of doctrines about the ontological and epistemological status of 
hinges (cf. Coliva 2016, forthcoming-b). If hinge epistemology is a family resemblance epistemological 
approach to long-standing problems such as relativism, I take it that the account proposed in this 
section is still part of this family. In particular, the account proposed constitutes a minimal epistemic 
reading of hinges. It is epistemic because particular hinges are the object of a doxastic-like attitude 
susceptible to rational and epistemic considerations. Roughly, particular codifications of the uber hinge 
are justified in light of the uber hinge.  
One might also worry that if particular hinges both carry propositional content and are 
susceptible to epistemic considerations, then it is unclear what prevents them from collapsing into 
revisable basic beliefs.33 If particular hinges are really basic, entrenched beliefs in disguise, the proposed 
account is doubly worrisome: it is no longer a hinge view (so that it does not offer a response to 
relativism from within the confines of hinge epistemology) and it faces familiar epistemological 
problems that hinge epistemology is at pains to solve: epistemic regress of justification, skepticism, etc. 
Fortunately, the proposed account does not make hinges collapse into basic and revisable beliefs, and 
that is why the account is not fully epistemic. First, the uber hinge is not susceptible to epistemic 
reasons. We cannot justify the uber hinge, since there is no meta-principle or higher order hinge to 
which we are in a position to appeal in order to make sure that the uber hinge is the right way of 
conducting our epistemic practices.34 Second, and more importantly, it is the codification of the uber hinge 
into particular hinges, and not the hinges themselves, what is susceptible to epistemic and rational 
considerations. The uber hinge in the form of a particular hinge is not susceptible to rational 
considerations because an attempt to justify it is not dialectically compelling. For instance, I said before 
that we cannot epistemically justify the general trust we have in our epistemic peers and that a 
purported justification of our trust in scientific textbooks is deemed to be circular. Nevertheless, in the 
proposed account, our coming to codify the uber hinge in particular hinges is susceptible to rational 
considerations. For instance, although we cannot justify our general trust in scientific textbooks, we 
certainly can realize that this particular codification of the uber hinge respects our general commitment 
to avoid radical and systematic deception in our epistemic system. Codifying one’s hinges in a way that 
 
33 I thank two anonymous referees of this journal for inviting me to clarify this point.  
34 This minimal epistemic reading is similar to Kusch (2016b). Kusch suggests that the uber hinge that we are not 
systematically deceived in our inquiries cannot be known or justified even though (particular) hinges such as 
Observation or Revelation are justifiable and knowable (cf. 2016b, 60 and ff.). Unlike other epistemic readings of 
hinges (such as Wright 2004, and Williams 2007), I do not think that the uber hinge is the object of a doxastic 
state that entails entitlement and/or knowledge. 
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is consistent with avoiding radical and systematic deception is a rational process. As I shall explain 
below, Galileo’s codification of the uber hinge in the form of Observation is justified because it is 
consistent with his more general commitment to avoid radical and systematic deception in his epistemic 
system. In contrast, Bellarmine’s codification of the uber hinge in the form of Revelation is not as 
justified. For in their historical context, a commitment to Revelation was at odds not only with the 
results of astronomy, but also with those of geometry and optics. If Revelation were the right hinge to 
commit to, more than one of Bellarmine’s cognitive enterprises would be doomed and he would be 
thus at risk of facing systematic deception. Bellarmine’s codification of the uber hinge is susceptible to 
rational considerations to the extent that he could re-codify his uber hinge in a way that the results of 
different cognitive enterprises do not imply that he is radically and systematically deceived. Thus, hinges 
are not basic and revisable beliefs. Rather, what is basic is our commitment to avoid deception, and 
what is revisable is our coming to avoid deception.  
 Let’s see more clearly how the above three characteristics of hinges interact in the context of 
Galileo and Bellarmine’s hinge disagreement. They accept different hinge propositions and methods. 
Bellarmine accepts Revelation, the proposition that the Scripture is a highly reliable source of 
information about the whereabouts of heavenly bodies and the origin and composition of the universe, 
while Galileo does not accept Revelation and the infallibility of the Scripture for accurately answering 
questions that could be answered empirically. Given that their disagreement is not only about particular 
beliefs (does the Earth move? Is it at the center of the Universe?), but also about hinges (is Revelation, 
or Observation, the right way to ascertain the whereabouts of astronomical bodies?), their dispute is not 
resolvable just by adding reasons for or against the beliefs that each party holds.  
Being rooted in what they accept as the valid way of forming beliefs, their hinge disagreement 
would be stressed, instead of resolved, just by defending their respective beliefs. What they should do 
to convince the other party is to defend their respective codifications of the uber hinge. Importantly, 
this defense does not consist in justifying the reliability of their respective codifications of the uber 
hinge. For instance, if Galileo defends the unrestricted validity of Observation, he would have to make 
use of the deliverances of that very same method, in which case the justification would not be 
dialectically compelling to someone, like Bellarmine, who already doubts the unrestricted validity of 
Observation. The same goes for Bellarmine. His defense of the infallibility of the Bible would require 
appealing to claims that are contained in the Bible, which is precisely what is at issue in the hinge 
disagreement.  
How should they defend their respective codifications of the uber hinge? Remember that, to be 
rationally resolvable, a hinge disagreement should meet the Discriminating condition without begging 
the question against one of the parties. The combination of the acceptance and the non-doxastic views 
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that I have outlined allows us to do that. What I want to suggest is that we can meet the Discriminating 
condition by determining whether a particular codification of the uber hinge would contradict the uber 
hinge. In other words, there are epistemic and rational considerations that (a) are available to every 
epistemic system (they are neutral and thus do not beg the question against any party) and (b) can help 
both parties to reach agreement as to what is the right codification of the uber hinge. 
In particular, I take it that the following reasoning can be entertained by any champion of any 
epistemic system: 
Rational codification: If my accepting the particular hinge X could lead me to think, at some 
point, that I am radically and systematically deceived, then I should not accept X provided that 
there is an alternative hinge Y that I am in a position to accept and Y, in comparison to X, 
would not let me to think that I am radically and systematically deceived.  
Rational codification is an epistemic meta-principle, in that it does not refer to what is justified to 
believe, but to what we are justified to take as the justifiers of our epistemic practices. Rational 
codification says that one cannot accept a hinge that would lead one to go against the uber hinge. 
Alternatively: one should not codify the uber hinge in such a way that one’s entire epistemic system is 
undermined. This means that hinges are susceptible to this kind of epistemic and rational 
considerations: one cannot justify Induction or Observation by appealing to the deliverances of those 
methods, but one certainly can justify one’s use of those methods by considering how systematically 
deceived in one’s enquiries one would be if one did not use those methods. Thus, if the uber hinge is 
the condition of possibility of every epistemic system without which no truth can be discerned and no 
measure of rationality is available, then every epistemic system that takes itself to be engaged cognitively 
and epistemically with the world should not accept hinge commitments that would make the very same 
practices of epistemic justification impossible or untenable.  
Now how does Rational codification meet the Discriminating condition? It would be unfair to 
say that Bellarmine is radically and systematically deceived in embracing Revelation, since his epistemic 
system by itself does not contradict or goes against the uber hinge. When first encountering Galileo, 
Bellarmine might think that Galileo was wrong. Now, when confronted with Galileo’s evidence, he 
could think that he might be wrong, which still does not entail being radically and systematically 
deceived. However, when the possibility of being wrong in one’s beliefs is so pervasive that one can 
only stick to one’s guns at the cost of losing one’s overall grip onto reality, then one is faced with 
Rational codification: one should guide one’s beliefs and commitments in such a way that one does not 
think of oneself that one is radically and systematically deceived. This is a rational path to resolve a 
hinge disagreement, one that was open to Bellarmine. If accepting Revelation (or restricting the validity 
of Observation) could lead Bellarmine to think that he is radically and systemically deceived in his 
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calculations about heavenly bodies and beliefs about the composition and movements of planets, 
moons, and light, then he should not consider Revelation as the right codification of the uber hinge. 
Importantly, Bellarmine’s encounter with Galileo provided grounds for the truth of the antecedent of 
the preceding conditional claim. The results of Galileo’s observations and calculations were as 
scientifically accurate as they could be, and yet they were at odds with the Scripture and more generally 
with a Geocentric model of the universe. Thus, Bellarmine was in the following situation: his 
acceptance of Revelation could lead him to think that all the arguments and calculations in favor of 
Heliocentrism were false, which would entail that our best ways of dealing cognitively with the world 
were grounded in radical and systematic deception. In other words, his encounter with Galileo’s 
evidence and unrestricted acceptance of Observation showed that to accept Revelation (and to dismiss 
Galileo’s results) would entail that most of our beliefs formed on the basis of experimentation, 
geometrical and mathematical grounds, were radically and fundamentally mistaken. This is tantamount 
to saying that if Bellarmine, after his encounter with Galileo, were to keep on accepting Revelation and 
rejecting the unrestricted validity of Observation, then his particular codification of the uber hinge 
would go against the very same condition of possibility of an epistemic system, i.e., to accept hinges 
and form beliefs as if one is not radically and systematically deceived in one’s cognitive enterprise.  
Does this procedure beg the question against Bellarmine? To see that this procedure is not only 
discriminative, but also neutral, consider Galileo’s situation. He is not in a position to think that his 
encounter with Bellarmine gives him reason to think that he might be radically and systematically 
mistaken in his beliefs. For, on the one hand, the fact that his observations and calculations contradict 
what the Scripture says does not undermine his epistemic practices. Thus, Galileo’s commitment to 
Observation does not lead him to suspect a massive breakdown in his epistemic system. Whereas if he 
were to embrace Revelation, he would be confronted with the possibility of being radically and 
systematically deceived in his epistemic practices as a naturalist. In this way, Observation should prevail 
over Revelation, independently of what the deliverances of these methods are. On the other hand, it 
might be that if Galileo finds that his observations and calculations contradict the Scripture, he might 
think that he is radically and systematically deceived in his religious beliefs. But to think that one is 
radically and systematically wrong in one’s religious beliefs does not undermine the foundation of one’s 
epistemic practices. These are two different kinds of breakdowns in one’s hinges, and only one of them 
is relevant for considering whether it is rationally possible to resolve a hinge disagreement in a neutral 
and discriminative way.  
To sum up, this proposal entails that hinge disagreements are rationally resolvable by evaluating 
which particular hinge commitment that creates the dispute goes against the uber hinge shared by every 
epistemic system. Importantly, this process of determining which particular hinge conflicts with the 
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uber hinge is available to any thoughtful user of any epistemic system. Remember that accepting implies 
the possibility of grasping, or seeing to rational or epistemic considerations that ground one’s hinges 
and epistemic practices. And it is also possible to accept a hinge proposition even if, unbeknownst to 
one, that proposition happens to be false. In this way, this kind of proposal does not require that one 
of the parties reaches the truth, or that a hinge disagreement is resolvable by showing which epistemic 
system is much more reliable (cf. Piedrahita 2020). Rather, the account of hinges on which this 
proposal depends entails that rational resolution, and rationality in general in our epistemic practices, 
means avoiding deception when engaging cognitively with the world. 
5 Conclusion 
Let’s wrap up. I argued that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic 
relativism and that two leading views of hinges (the acceptance account and the non-doxastic account) 
face some problems when they try to avoid it. I then built from both accounts a minimally epistemic 
view of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism by showing how to rationally resolve hinge 
disagreements. Roughly, my proposal says that relativism is unmotivated because not all epistemic 
systems are on a par with respect to the uber hinge. Rational resolution of hinge disagreements occurs 
when one of the parties comes to see that her hinge commitments and beliefs should be modified, 
otherwise she would face the epistemic consequence of being radically and fundamentally deceived in 
her inquiries.  
 Although the proposed account offers hinge epistemologists a way out of the relativistic 
challenge, it should be noticed that its plausibility is doubly conditional.35 On the one hand, the 
proposed account should be appealing to those who share the assumption that epistemic relativism is 
problematic and that we do not have a principled reason to believe it is true. If a hinge epistemologist 
considers that there is nothing worrisome about epistemic relativism, or even that it is true, my 
proposal of how to close the door to epistemic relativism would not be particularly pressing.36 On the 
other hand, my account of hinges, which heavily relies on the uber hinge and on our capacity to 
structure our epistemic practices in a way that is true to it, should be appealing to those who see that 
hinge epistemology can easily collapse into epistemic relativism and that the more influential accounts 
of hinges are independently insufficient to respond to the relativistic challenge. In this way, the scope 
and force of this paper is admittedly modest: if one thinks that relativism should be avoided, and that 
we cannot easily do so with the acceptance and non-doxastic accounts of hinges taken independently, 
 
35 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for inviting me to clarify this point.  
36 For philosophers sympathetic both to hinge epistemology and epistemic relativism, see Ashton (2019; 
forthcoming) and Kusch (2016a; 2017a).  
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then I have offered reasons to believe that epistemic relativism is kept at bay once we realize that given 
our commitment to avoid self-deception in our epistemic practices, we are in a position to rationally 
persuade and be persuaded that a given epistemic system is not on the right track.37 
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